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UID:20250804T163134EDT-9135DKnJaa@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20250804T203134Z
DESCRIPTION:Some scholars argue that democratic stability requires politica
 l elites to practice forbearance: roughly speaking\, “restraint in deployi
 ng their institutional prerogatives” (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). The pape
 r proposes a novel account of forbearance and the mechanism by which it st
 abilizes democracies. Public officials exercise forbearance when they refr
 ain from actions of “dubious legitimacy\,” actions that\, while in fact co
 mpatible with democracy’s constitutive rules\, are not commonly known to b
 e. The argument is that such actions gradually undermine citizens’ ability
  to coordinate their responses to genuine abuses of power because they cre
 ate uncertainty about the extent to which other citizens are willing to co
 ndone breaches of democracy’s rules. The article concludes with observatio
 ns about the normative implications of the theory\, introducing the concep
 t of the “democrat’s dilemma” to illustrate the practical difficulties of 
 knowing when democrats ought to exercise forbearance. \n
DTSTART:20250320T200000Z
DTEND:20250320T230000Z
LOCATION:Thomson House\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 1Y2\, 3650 rue McTavish
SUMMARY:RGCS : Sean Ingham 'The Democrat's Dilemma: A Theory of Institution
 al Forbearance and Democratic Stability'
URL:/lin-centre/channels/event/rgcs-sean-ingham-democr
 ats-dilemma-theory-institutional-forbearance-and-democratic-stability-3574
 99
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